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Statistical practice is peppered with examples of ‘magic’ numbers such as the 
infamous alpha = .05 of null hypothesis significance testing. Similarly, sample size 
calculations typically assume a desired statistical power of .80 and nearly always use 
‘canned’ effect sizes such as d = 0.5 (Lenth, 2001; Baguley, 2004). Some of the most 
interesting cases  are for commonly used cut-off criteria, such as keeping factors 
where the eigenvalue > 1 in factor analysis; requiring reliability > .70 in scale 
construction; or a goodness-of-fit-index or GFI > .90 in structural equation modelling 
(Lance et al., 2006). What’s interesting is that these ‘magic’ numbers all have several 
things in common. 
First, they all seem to have arisen by a process of academic Chinese Whispers (see 
Vicente & Brewer, 1993, for empirical evidence of this kind of effect in use of 
citations). Take the requirement for reliability > .70. Lance et al. (2006) show that 
where a source is given for this cut-off it is almost invariably Nunnally’s 
Psychometric Theory. However, the closest Nunnally comes to saying this is: 
In the early stages of research . . . one saves time and energy by working with 
instruments that have only modest reliability, for which purpose reliabilities of .70 or 
higher will suffice… 
(Nunnally, 1978, p.245) 
 
Nunnally even notes that reliabilities in excess of 0.90 may be inadequate in many 
situations. The problem is that while early citations of Nunnally’s book were largely 
accurate, later authors cited him without consulting the original text. Fairly soon the 
nuance and context of the original source is lost and the citation becomes the ritual 
acknowledgement of a common authority. Eventually reliability > .70 becomes 
commonly accepted wisdom– more accurately myth or urban legend (Vandenberg, 
2006) – and a citation is no longer required. 
Second, they are – as far as I can tell, without exception – wrong. To be fair, they do 
differ in degree of wrongness: ranging from mildly misleading to terminally myopic. 
In addition, they are all wrong for more or less the same reason. In every case they 
involve taking a continuous quantity and reducing it to a single number. Take, for 
instance, the a = .05 threshold. As Rosnow & Rosenthal put it: 
Surely, God loves the .06 nearly as much as the .05. Can there be any doubt that God 
views the strength of evidence for or against the null as a fairly continuous function of 
the magnitude of p? 
[Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989, p.177] 
 
This isn’t just the prerogative of null hypothesis significance testing (though it can 
claim some of the most widespread and most egregious cases). For example, in a 
recent paper on alternative (Bayesian) approaches to statistical inference 
Wagenmakers (2007) wryly comments that ‘people apparently find it difficult to deal 
with continuous levels of evidence’ before discussing the lumping of Bayes factors 
into discrete categories, such as that suggested by Raftery (1995). Wagenmakers 
points out that ‘statistically, this desire [to reduce a Bayes factor to a dichotomous 
decision] is entirely unfounded’. I would argue that this conclusion could readily be 
generalised to other statistics. It isn’t always a good idea to present findings as the 
output of such a dichotomous decision. Even when it is necessary (or convenient) to 
reach a decision on this way, it makes no sense to use the same threshold or cut-off in 
all situations. My own favourite example is collinearity in multiple regression. 
Collinearity does not simply arise when two predictors are correlated > .90 (though 
very high values can make computing the coefficients tricky depending on the 
software you use). As long as there is any shared variance between predictors it will 
be somewhat difficult to tease the effects of the predictors apart, and the precision 
with which their individual effects are measured will suffer (and thus statistical power 
to detect effects of individual predictors is compromised). 
It isn’t all doom and gloom, though. I recognise that people sometimes find simple 
rules of thumb useful, and many of the examples I’ve used started off in just this way. 
Cohen’s effect size guidelines and recommendations for power calculations are a case 
in point (e.g. Cohen, 1969). In particular, estimating statistical power for supposedly 
‘small’ (d = .2), ‘medium’ (d = .5) or ‘large’ (d = .8) effects was at first intended only 
as a method of last resort. The problem is that when these rules of thumb become 
articles of faith in the rituals of statistics, the benefits they provide are lost. The 
solution is simple. Just remember that although these ‘magic’ numbers can 
occasionally be useful, they are always wrong. Don’t end up doing statistics by 
numbers. 
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